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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS
In Rivera v. Berkeley Super Wash, Inc.,1 a personal injury action
was brought against a self-service laundromat and the manufacturer
of an allegedly defective laundry extractor by the injured party, Alberto Rivera, Jr., and his parents. The machine had been sold to the
laundromat in 1959. On his eighth birthday, in 1967, Alberto, by
reaching into the extractor while it was in operation, sustained injuries which caused the eventual amputation of his arm.
The plaintiffs2 initially sought recovery on the grounds of negligence. In 1973, they amended their complaint to add causes of action
in implied warranty and strict products liability. The manufacturer,
Bock Laundry Machine Co., interposed the defense of the statute of
limitations, claiming that the contract statute of limitations, which
runs from the date of sale, was applicable to actions based on warranty and strict products liability.3 The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss and Bock appealed. In a 3-2 decision, the appellate division, second department, held: that the causes of action based on
warranty are time-barred; 4 but that the statute of limitations in
strict products liability actions is controlled by tort law and runs
from the date of injury, not the date of sale, 5 thereby allowing the
infant plaintiff to proceed with the merits of the case.
1. 44 App. Div. 2d 316, 354 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1974).

2. Both the infant and his parents were plaintiffs in the proceeding. On each
separate cause of action (negligence, warranty, and strict products liability),
parents asserted a derivative cause of action based on loss of services.

the

3. Since the laundry extractor was sold in 1959, prior to the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code by New York, a six-year statute of limitations which commenced at the time of sale would apply. Currently, actions predicated on breach of
warranty are governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. N.Y. Civ. PRac. LAw
§ 21.3(2) (McKinney 1972); see N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (McKinney 1964), which
provides that: "An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued." The cause of action accrues
"when delivery is made .

. . ."

Id. § 2-725(2).

4. 44 App. Div. 2d at 326, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 663.
5. Id. at 318, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 655; accord, Victorson v. Kaplan, 75 Misc. 2d
429, 347 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1973), a/'d sub nom. mem. Victorson v. Bock
Laundry Machine Co., 44 App. Div. 2d 702, 355 N.Y.S.2d 565 (2d Dep't 1974). The
Rivera court also ruled that the parents' derivative cause of action in strict products
liability was barred by time because more than three years had passed between the
injury in 1967 and the amendment to their complaint in 1973. See N.Y. Civ. PRAac.
LAW § 214 (McKinney 1972). The tolling provisions of section 208 of the Civil
Practice Laws and Rules were held applicable to the infant's claim for personal injury.
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In holding that the tort statute of limitations should govern actions predicated on strict liability, the court ruled that a prior
decision by the New York Court of Appeals in Mendel v. Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. 6 was no longer controlling on the issue of the limitations period in strict products liability. Both Mendel and the instant
case involved plaintiffs who were injured by defective products more
than six years after the date of sale. Similarly, neither plaintiff was
the purchaser of the product that caused the injury. The Rivera court
gave effect to the Mendel decision insofar as the warranty counts
were concerned. In the 1969 Mendel case, the majority reiterated a
long-standing rule that personal injury actions based on the breach
of an implied warranty are contract actions 7 and hence accrue at the
time of sale. The court of appeals went further, however, and equated
warranty and strict liability actions: "[W]e believe . . . that strict
liability in tort and implied warranty in the absence of privity are8
merely different ways of describing the very same cause of action."
The Rivera court determined that the Mendel rule, as it applied
to strict products liability, was no longer viable in light of the subsequent decision by the court of appeals in Codling v. Paglia.9 In
that case, the court announced the doctrine of strict products liability,
applying a three-pronged test:
[U]nder a doctrine of strict products liability, the manufacturer of
a defective product is liable to any person injured . . .if the defect

was a substantial factor in bringing about his injury or damages, provided: (1) ... the product is being used ...for the purpose and in
the manner normally intended, (2) that if the person injured or damaged is himself the user of the product he would not by the exercise
of reasonable care have both discovered the defect and perceived its
danger, and (3) that by the exercise of reasonable care the person
6. 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207, 305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).

7. See, e.g., Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421
(1953) ; cf. N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (b) (McKinney 1964), which expressly recognizes
a cause of action for personal injury arising from breach of warranty. See also id.
§ 2-318, which extends the protection of the Code to some, but not all, bystanders.
8. 25 N.Y.2d at 345, 253 N.E.2d at 210, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
9. 32 N.Y. 2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). See also Velez
v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 305 N.E.2d 750, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617
(1973); Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644
(1973); Fogal v. Genesee Hosp., 41 App. Div. 2d 468, 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (4th Dep't
1973). For analyses of the Codling decision, see Watkins, Codling v. Paglia, 38
ALBANY L. REV. 3 (1973); Comment, Codling v. Paglia, 40 BROOKLYN L. RnV. 390
(1973).
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injured or damaged would not otherwise have averted his injury or
damages. 10
The underlying rationale of the Mendel court was that strict liability
evolved from, and was delimited by, contract law.11 In order to determine that Mendel was no longer viable, the majority in the instant
case viewed the Codling decision as establishing an independent action grounded in tort: "[W]e believe that Codling overruled Mendel's
reliance on the Uniform Commercial Code when it (Codling) provided an alternative remedy sounding in tort."' 2
The Rivera majority relied on its interpretation of the Codling
three-pronged test as establishing a tort concept of strict products liability.1 3 To recover under a theory of strict products liability, the
plaintiff must show not only that he had been injured by a defective
product, but also that he could not have avoided the injury through
the exercise of reasonable care. The last two criteria of the threepronged test, set forth above, indicate that contributory negligence and
assumption of risk, defenses available in tort proceedings, are relevant
in strict products liability actions. The court of appeals in Codling
clearly stated that contributory negligence of the plaintiff would bar
recovery.

14

Tort law's emphasis on the compensation of victims was another
factor in tle majority's conclusion that strict products liability should
be interpreted as a tort concept. Judge Shapiro, writing for the majority, examined the policy reasons behind the adoption of strict
liability,' 5 stating that "the clear intent of the recent decisions is to
protect a party injured ... by a defective product,"' 6 and concluding
10. 32 N.Y.2d at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70.
11. For an analysis of the contrasts and similarities between theories of recovery
under contract and strict liability in tort, see Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel
Doctrines, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 692 (1965).
12. 44 App. Div. 2d at 324, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 662 (emphasis added); see Velez
v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 117, 124-25, 305 N.E. 2d 750, 754, 350
N.Y.S.2d 617, 623 (1973).
13. For a discussion of the Codling test, see text accompanying note 10 supra.
14. 32 N.Y.2d at 343, 298 N.E.2d at 629, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
15. See, e.g., Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350
N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973). In Bolm, the court of appeals focused on protection and compensation for the injured party: "As was pointed out in Codling, liability for defective
products has . . . been increasingly shifted to the responsible manufacturer in order
'to avoid injustice and for the protection of the public' .... " Id. at 158, 305 N.E.2d
at 773, 350 N.Y.S. 2d at 650 (citation omitted).
16. 44 App. Div. 2d at 321, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
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that the policy could be effectuated only by measuring the statute of
limitations from the date of injury.
Application of the contract Statute of Limitations to the strictproducts-liability causes of action here, claims grounded in the concept of a tortious wrong, would only serve to duplicate the unfair
Mendel result. The infant plaintiff Rivera was born in 1959, the
same year in which the sale of the extractor took place. Eight years
later this machine was to cause the loss of his arm. To apply the
contract Statute of Limitations . . . would mean that the limitation

period expired two years prior to the accident.1 7

In addition to focusing on the injustice to the plaintiff, the
majority also noted that the Mendel rationale was rejected by other
jurisdictions.'8 In fact, the court concluded that there was no authoritative support for Mendel.19
To further augment his argument that strict products liability
is grounded in tort, Judge Shapiro emphasized that the nature of
Rivera's claim was an action for personal injury. Traditionally, tort
law has furnished relief for personal injury claims. Contract law was
designed to remedy commercial loss. The majority reasoned that the
suit should therefore be governed by section 214 (5) of New York's
Civil Practice Law and Rules, which provides a three-year statute of
limitations period for personal injury actions which runs from the
time of injury.2 0 The court emphasized that the limitations period
17. Id. at 325, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 662-63.
18. See, e.g., Nelson v. Volkswagen of America, 315 F. Supp. 1120 (D.N.H.
1970); Tucker v. Capitol Mach., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 291 (M.D. Pa. 1969); Holifield
v. Setco Indus., 42 Wis. 2d 750, 168 N.W.2d 177 (1969); Roseneau v. City of New
Brunswick, 51 NJ. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968). In Nelson, the federal court was firm
in rejecting the hypothesis that strict liability and implied warranty are one and the
same:
Products containing defects when manufactured, which remain undetected are
veritable time bombs ready to explode in the face of the hapless consumer
at any time ....
In states which accept the doctine of strict liability in tort, the
.
theory of breach of warranty should have no place in personal injury cases,
315 F. Supp. at 1122.
19. 44 App. Div. 2d at 322 n.7, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 660 n.7. In fairness to the
Mendel majority, it must be noted that few courts have been confronted with the precise problem that faced the Mendel court; an injury resulting from a defective product
long after the date of sale.
20. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 214(5) (McKinney 1972). But cl. N.Y. U.C.C.
§§ 2-315, -318 (McKinney 1964). For a unique extension of the tort statute of limita-
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includes, but is not limited to, negligence actions. 2 ' Since a cause of
action for personal injury on a strict products liability theory falls
within the wording of section 214 (5), it therefore should be subjected
to the three-years-from-date-of-injury rule. The majority stressed that
there is no one theory of products liability, that the Uniform Commercial Code and the doctrine of strict products liability are not
mutually exclusive.
The result of the legal development of a strict-products-liability cause
of action is that redress for personal injuries caused by defective

products may be sought in New York under several different theories
-(1) pure common-law negligence, (2) breach of warranty and (3)
strict products liability .... 22
The court recognized that its holding was subject to the criticism
that manufacturers' liability might be extended indefinitely. The coexistence of different theories of liability might allow an injured party
to develop its litigation strategy based on the particular time lag
between the sale, the injury, and the commencement of the suit. The
court maintained, however, that the alternative-the foreclosure of
meritorious claims--justified its holding:
[I]t seems unwise to accept the sacrifice of any meritorious claim as
the necessary price to be paid for the insulation of manufacturers
from exposure to meritless claims, especially since these same manufacturers are open to suits in negligence. Moreover, . . . the policy

decision behind the establishment of a strict-products-liability action
having been made by the Court of Appeals, it would appear that
more harm is done by refusing to recognize its essential character as
based in tort than by intentionally misapprehending it for the sake of
protecting against false claims and thereby potentially blunting its
usefulness ... in cases in which there is merit.P
tions in products liability cases, see Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 486 F.2d 538 (4th
Cir. 1973). In Maynard, the court applied the personal injury statute of limitations to
a cause of action in warranty. "The view of the majority of the courts which have
considered the question appears to be that an action to recover for personal injuries is,
in essence, a personal injury action and, regardless of whether it is based upon . . .
breach of implied warranty or . . . tort, the limitations statute applicable to actions
for personal injuries is controlling." Id. at 540.
21. 44 App. Div. 2d at 323, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
22. Id. at 321, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 659.
23. Id. at 324-25, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 662 (emphasis in original). For an analysis of
the policy reasons behind the adoption of strict liability, see Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); Prosser, The
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The Rivera court's opinion that strict products liability is
grounded in tort finds support in case law, 24 commentaries,

Restatement (Second) of Torts.

2

25

.and the

Since strict liability's emphasis on

"defect" is conceptually analogous to the breach of an implied war-

ranty of merchantability, the debate of whether the action lies in
contract or tort becomes important when the effect of disclaimers,
privity, and the selection of a limitations period must be decided.

In the instant case, where the last issue was in dispute, the characterization as tort or contract was determinative of the outcome of

the case. It was precisely Judge Shapiro's characterization of strict
products liability as a tort that the dissent challenges.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Benjamin 27 was premised on
the assumption that Codling and Mendel are reconcilable. 28 He asserted that Codling did not create a new substantive basis for li-

ability; rather it merely enlarged the possible class of plaintiffs by
allowing an innocent bystander to sue.
I read Codling as having removed the remaining "pillar" from
the beleagured citadel of privity, thus.., extending to "any" person
Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099
(1960); Comment, Strict Products Liability and The Bystander, 64 COLUri. L. REv.
916 (1964).
24. See, e.g., Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412 (1973);

Caruth v. Mariani, 11 Ariz. App. 188, 463 P.2d 83 (1970) ; Elmore v. American Motors,
70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 37,7 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963). But cf. Grecno v.
Clark Equip. Co., 237 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. Ind. 1965). See generally Chestnut v.
Ford Motor Co., 445 'F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971); Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296
F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
25. See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1134 (1960); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966). See generally Dickerson,
The ABC's of Products Liability, 36 TENN. L. REV. 439 (1969); Comment, The Last
Vestige of the Citadel, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 721 (1974).
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment m (1965), provides:
The basis of liability is purely one of tort ....
. . . [Tjhe warranty theory has become something of an obstacle to the
recognition of . . . strict liability ....
...
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions of the
...
Uniform Commercial Code ....

27. 44 App. Div. 2d at 326-29, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 664-67. Justice Cohalen also
dissented in a one paragraph opinion stating that Mendel was dispositive of the instant
case. Id. at 329, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 667.
28. See Dickerson, Was Prosser's Folly Also Traynor's?, 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469,
471 (1974); Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make A Right, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rnv.
1065, 1104-05 (1973).
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injured by a defective product the full benefits of the express and
implied warranty protection contained in the Uniform Commercial
Code .... 29
The dissent further maintained that the language of the court of
appeals in Velez v. Craine & Clark Lumber Corp. to the effect that

"strict products liability sounds in tort rather than contract"30 was
not technically binding on the instant case.
The terminology employed in the area of products liability i.e.,
"strict liability in tort" and "strict products liability", has resulted in
some confusion. Language . . . in Codling . . . must therefore be interpreted against the background of cases which preceded it.31

Judge Benjamin, therefore, viewed the Mendel equation of "strict
liability in tort" and breach of implied warranty as encompassing
the Codling doctrine of strict products liability. He concluded that
the breach of warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code
32
furnished the exclusive remedy in products liability cases.
The dissent's argument that Codling and Mendel are compatible
is not compelling for two reasons. First, if the court in Codling
merely intended to extend the protection of the Uniform Commercial Code to bystanders, it could have done so, more directly, by
announcing that the then-current state of the law, as evidenced by
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp.,3 3 Mendel, and the Code,
would be applicable to bystanders. The delineation of a doctrine of
strict products liability, with its attendant requirement that plaintiffs
meet three criteria in order to recover, would not have been neces29. 44 App. Div. 2d at 327, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
30. 33 N.Y.2d 117, 124-25, 305 N.E.2d 750, 754, 350 N.Y.S.2d 617, 623 (1973).
In Velez, the court of appeals refused to give effect to a disclaimer in an action brought
on the theory of strict products liability. Since the parties who were injured by the
product were strangers to the sales contract, the disclaimer was ineffective as applied to
them. As between parties to the contract, the court opined: "[W]e see no reason why
• . . parties cannot by contract restrict or modify what would otherwise be a liability
between them grounded in tort." Id. (emphasis added).
31. 44 App. Div. 2d at 328, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 666 (emphasis added).
32. Id.
33. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963). In Goldberg, the
court of appeals characterized the breach of an implied warranty as a tortious wrong,
but the Mendel court later interpreted this language as merely eroding the concept of
privity. See notes 7-8 supra& accompanying text.
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sary.34 Furthermore, the doctrine is applicable to "any '' 35 person: it is
not limited to suits brought by innocent bystanders.
Second, the dissent minimized the policy reasons behind the adoption of strict liability, namely, the protection of an innocent party
who could not have avoided the injury and the placing, of the burden
of costs of injury upon the manufacturers, the parties most capable
of absorbing the loss. 36 The dissent preferred the contract statute of
limitations to insure that the manufacturers' exposure to suit would
not be extended in time indefinitely.3 7 Since the manufacturer in the
instant case still may be liable in negligence (if the plaintiff can
prove that the manufacturer did not use due care, a virtually insurmountable proof problem), there may not be an adequate justification
to foreclose a suit based on strict products liability. It appears that
Judge Benjamin may have equated strict products liability and absolute liability. But to establish liability under the Codling doctrine, the
plaintiff must show more than resultant injury: he still must prove
that the product was defective. As Judge Breitel pointed out in his
dissent to Mendel, "the passage of time has the effect of making quite
difficult the proof that the defect was due to the manufacturer rather
than to circumstances, passage of time, users and repairers of the
product .
38 If Judge Breitel's analysis is correct, then it would
appear that foreclosure of suits grounded in strict products liability is
not necessary to protect the manufacturer from meritless claims.
Assuming arguendo that Codling and Mendel can be reconciled,
the dissent failed to explore adequately why they should be reconciled.
It seems unreasonable to foreclose an innocent party's suit for personal
injury on the ground that the limitations period should be governed
by commercial contract law. Since the plaintiff in the instant case was
not a party to the original sales contract, there is no compelling reason
to restrict his opportunity for redress to the existence of that sales
contract.
The future impact of Rivera is not yet clear. Despite Rivera's
clear rejection of Mendel, a supreme court in Broome County, in
"...

34. See text accompanying note 10 supra.

35. For the dissent's analysis in the instant case of the significance (or more
accurately nonsignificance) of the word "any", see text accompanying note 29 supra.
36. See materials cited note 23 supra.
37. 44 App. Div. 2d at 328, 354 N.Y.S.2d at 666.
38. 25 N.Y.2d at 351, 253 N.E.2d at 214, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 499.
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Lewis v. John Royle & Sons,39 found the two cases compatible. The
court in that case interpreted the second, department's opinion as
drawing yet another distinction in products liability law. "It appears
that a significant distinction is unfolding between 'strict liability in
tort' . . . and 'strict products liability' . .. 40 The court in Broome
County held that a strict products liability action is controlled by
Rivera, while a strict liability in tort action is governed by the Mendel
rule.41 This is a specious distinction based on semantics. While it is
true that Codling and Rivera speak only of strict products liability, it
serves no legitimate purpose to maintain that there is a substantive
difference between that doctrine and what is referred to in other
jurisdictions as strict liability in tort. To continue on the road to
verbal confusion, as the lower court's opinion in Lewis would have
us do, is to compound the problem of understanding the law in this
rapidly changing field.
There is one line of authority that holds that breach of warranty
actions should govern purely economic loss, while strict products liability as a tort concept should control suits for personal injury. 42 The
basis of the personal-injury/economic-loss dichotomy lies in an interpretation of the reasons for the promulgation of the Uniform Commercial Code. Economic loss refers to the loss of the value of the
bargain, that is, purely commercial losses. Since the Code was designed
to govern commercial transactions, the remedy for economic losses
arising from those transactions should be restricted to the provisions
39. 79 Misc. 2d 304, 357 N.Y.S.2d 601 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 362 N.Y.S.2d 262 (3d
Dep't 1974). In Lewis, the plaintiff's original suit in negligence was dismissed. Since the
plaintiff's injury occurred in 1968, he could not initiate a cause of action predicated
on strict products liability more than three years from the date of injury.
40. Id. at 306, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 604 (footnotes omitted); see Jerry v. Borden Co.,
45 Apl. Div. 2d 344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426 (2d Dep't 1974), in which the appellate
division wrote: "There are, of course, differences between a cause of action for strict
liability in tort and a cause of action for breach of warranty .

. . ."

Id. at 347, 358

N.Y.S.2d at 430. Note the language of the court, "strict liability in tort." It would be
helpful if the court were consistent in its use of language. "Strict products liability" was
the terminology employed by both Codling and Rivera. The plethora of terms used to
describe an action in products liability apparently resulted in the verbal confusion
illustrated by the Lewis opinion.
41. 79 Misc. 2d 306-07, 357 N.Y.S.2d 604-05.
42. See Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972);
Hawkins Constr. Co. v. Matthews Co., 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973); Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Adler, Strict
Products Liability, 2 HoFsTRA L. R Ev. 581, 585 (1974). Contra, Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); Comment, The Expanding
Scope of Enterprise Liability, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1084, 1102 (1969).
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of the Code. The fact that the Code also allows recovery for personal
injury should not, in and of itself, indicate that recovery.under the
Code must be exclusive, of the tort law. Similarly, since the occurrence of personal injury is related only peripherally (if at all) to the
contract for sale, personal injury actions should be delimited by tort
law. This dichotomy may not adequately protect consumer interests,
but it is preferable to the dissent's all-or-nothing approach. Too often,
under Judge Benjamin's analysis, the plaintiff would end up with
nothing, foreclosed from suit because sale of the chattel preceded the
43
injury by more than four years.
By removing the bar of privity in Codling, the court of appeals
attempted to eliminate one of the last vestiges of a contract theory of
products liability. The announcement of the new doctrine of strict
products liability was the first step in nullifying the much-criticized
Mendel rule. 44 To give Codling its full effect, it is necessary to place
actions for personal injury where they belong-in tort law, governed
by that statute of limitations.
Strict products liability is a relatively new thing . . . thus far not

fitting with complete comfort into any preexisting contract or tort
setting. But it seems ...

less uncomfortable as a tort theory. There-

fore, it is hoped that states such as New York will abandon warranty
principles .... 45
The alternative is to retain part of the citadel established by the law
of sales. As long as that barrier is allowed to preclude actions for
personal injury, solely on the basis of when a sales contract was executed, the protection afforded by Codling is illusory.
FLORENCE V. DE,.AN
43. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-725 (McKinney 1964).
44. See notes 18-19 supra & accompanying text.
45. Marschall, supra note 28, at 1106-07.

